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SOCIAL ORDER, RULES AND SOCIOLOGY




The theoretical development of sociology leaves much to be desired. This is
not only the case in those {ields that, as everyone concerned agrees, would
profit from having more adequate theories to draw on. In this book a num-
ber of sociological principles and methodological points of view are formul-
ated which enable us to {ormulate a number of issues as 'internal-scientific'
problems; these issues, which are usually dealt with pre-scientifically as in-
quirer's choices and preferences, and which e.g. are presented as'methodo-
logical dilemmas', can be reformulated as problems for which solutions
can be looked for by constructing theories and empirical inquiry.
The first chapter points out that it is certainly not self-evident how the
obiect of a science should be described. We cannot e.g. accept as a matter
ol course that colloquial language will be suitable. However, there is not
much point in formulating 'definitions' either. It is a theory which should
hand us the means by which we can characterize the object of inquiry.
Two models are discussed concerning sociology. The first is the logical-
empirical one. Where it deteriorates in behaviourism, it can be formally
proved to fall short of its purpose: for the description of behaviour in general
theoretical terms are required, which refer to the way in which the behaviour
is constituted. If that is accepted, however, the problem of theoretical terms
arises for the logical-empiricist, The second model is a hermeneutic one.
k is pointed out how various arguments which are brought to the fore by
exponents of this model run parallel with criticism from modern philo-
sophy of science on logical-empiricism.
Traditionally, the central problem of sociology is that of social order. Pre-
scientifically it can be introduced by referring to experiences of'die irger-
liche Tatsache der Gesellschaft' (Dahrendorf). The second chapter discusses
how it is reconstructed internal-scientifically in Berger and Luckmann's
'The Social Construction of Realiry'.
Berger and Luckmann distinguish'society as subjective reality' and'socie-
ry as objective reality' and they suppose that these levels are produced by a
dialectical process.
On the basis of Schiitz's work the difficulties in describing the first level
r-
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are dealt with. One of Schiitz's central methodological criteria, the so-called
'postulate of adequacy', turns out to be undecidable, unless it is previous-
ly assumed that the actors have rules at their disposal which organize their
experiences and behaviour. These rules cannot be considered a priori to
be introspectively available. They are shared socially.
Difficulties in describing 'sociery as objective realiry' are discussed with
a view to Durkheim's work. There too, it is shown that, in order to escape
methodological problems, the assumption that the actor's behaviour is rule-
governed is necessary.
The jnternal-scientific reconstrucdon of the problem of social order which
Berger and Luckmann have given, then proves to be ut-rsatisfactory. They
have failed to indicate the framework in which the dialectical process they
refer to, or its products, can be examined in en empirical-scientific manner.
In the third chapter attention is paid in the first place to the concepts of
'rule'and 'rule-governed behaviour'. Searle's arguments, observations as to
the role of 'soci:rl meanings' or 'actor-intuitions' and a reconstruction of the
development of \0ittgenstein's philosophy lead up to the conclusion that
anyone who wishes to describe social facts in a internal-scientific way, will
have to draw attention to the rules that constitute these facts.'Rule-governed
behaviour'is sociated behaviour, behaviour relative to which actors share
intuitions as to the way in which it can be or should be continued.
Next, it is argued with a view to Elias'work, that rules express dependen-
ces of actors which are members of a figuration, a netwerk of actors whose
rule-governed behaviour is mutually interwoven. Thus a new internal-
scientific formulation of the problem of social order can be formulated: the
problem is first to describe which rules are followed by the actors partici-
pating in a certain figuration, and secondly to explain rvhy actors follow
these rather than different rules.
The sociological principles formulated in chapter 3 are developed in
the next chapter as to their methodological side. To starr with, a recon-
struction of scientific theories is given in which so-called'descriptive theories'
are not regarded as sets of statements, but as a 'structure-predicate' and a
set oi 'intended applications'. A theory of this kind enables us to produce de-
scriptions of nerv applications, to express our conjectures as to the structure
of phenomena. Such a theory can be interpreted realistically: it establishes
how facts are effected and stipulates possibilities.
It will now be possible to describe figurations by a theory which ex-
presses the rules which actors follow within those figurations.
Vith descliptive theories of this kind the first level of a sociological
- 
theory has been defined. The second level consists of explanations, ac-
cording to the traditional hypothetical-deductive model, although the ex-
planandum in this case does not consist of a description of some phenome-
non or other, but of a descriptive theory, which characterizes a 'social
order'.
2 ) 4
By characterizing actors as those who follow certain rules, the quesrion
can be answered who belong within a certain figuration. It also prou., por-
sible to reconstru* the dynamical, process-like character of these fisur_
ations.
A theory which characterizes actors will arso enable us to formurate thetraditional'merhodological dilemma' of individualism yersus collectivism
as an empirical problem. The role of the concept of freedom within a soci-
ological theory can also be discussed in this way: it is possible to reformulate
a number of themes rvhich are traditionaily a.sociated with the.on..p, ofireedom in rerms of rules and figurations. This makes them suitable for em-pirical inquiry.
In th.is fourth chapter the subject of the actors-interpretations is arso dealt
with..This subject, too, it proves possible to formulare as an internal-scientific
problem, as a question for which an answer may be found by ,f,_f_fr._
mation and empir ical inquiry.
. 
Fina'lly, various aspects of theory-formation in sociorogy are illustratedbv an example, dealing with inquiries into political power.
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